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ABSTRACT  
This paper investigates the impact of minimum wages on wages and employment in 
Greece between 2009 and 2017. Our main contribution is the examination of the effects 
of minimum wages under a dramatically changing context, as during this period Greece 
has experienced the deepest recession in its recent history, extensive labour market 
reforms, and several changes in the minimum wage, including a large decrease. 
Employing a unique administrative panel matched employer-employee data set and a 
range of estimators, such as difference-in-differences, fixed effects, and Instrumental 
Variables, we find that minimum wages have a positive and significant effect on 
individual and firm-level wages with significant positive wage spill-overs extending, 
sometimes, above the median wage, but no systematic employment effects.   
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1. Introduction  
The literature on the employment effects of minimum wages is vast. The seminal work 
of Card and Krueger (1995) and a large number of subsequent studies (e.g., Machin et 
al., 2003) that produced evidence of no or even positive employment effects of 
minimum wages seemed to have dented the earlier consensus that higher minimum 
wages decrease employment (Brown et al., 1982). Despite this, there have been 
divergent views on whether the issue has been decisively settled and what could be the 
most fruitful areas for future research (Manning, 2016; Neumark, 2018).  
On the one hand there are those who suggest that the employment effect of the 
minimum wage has been elusive, but acknowledge that there is a limit up to which 
minimum wages could be increased without reducing employment and thus the key 
policy question is to identify this limit (Manning, 2016). International organisations as 
well as several policy makers seem to share this view (e.g., see joint report by IMF, World 
Bank, OECD, and ILO, ILO (2012) and the Irish Low Pay Commission report, 2018). 
On the other hand, there are those who point toward the more recent divergent 
evidence on the employment effects of minimum wages (e.g., Neumark, Salas, and 
Wascher, 2014; Allegreto et al., 2017) and suggest that future research should 
investigate the methodological/econometric as well as economic factors that could 
explain this (Neumark, 2018).  
A point of convergence, however, of these views on future research priorities on 
minimum wages is that an investigation is warranted on whether the magnitude of 
employment effects of minimum wages may vary depending on a range of factors 
(Manning, 2016; Neumark, 2018). For example, a negative employment effect of 
minimum wages may be more likely to be detected in a context where the initial level 
of the minimum wage is relatively high, the magnitude of the change in the minimum 
wage is large, the level of aggregate economic activity is low, and labour market 
regulation is weak. Therefore, there are much to be learned from studies in such 
contexts.  
A number of studies from Europe, such as Portugal (Pereira, 2003; Portugal and Cardoso, 
2006), Ireland (O’Neill, Nolan and Williams, 2006), and Hungary (Harasztosi and Lindner, 
2015) seem to suggest that, at best, large increases in minimum wages in countries 
where the level of minimum wages is relatively high have no or small negative 
employment effects. These studies, although informative, do not provide evidence of 
how results may vary depending on the point of the business cycle at which the change 
is enacted and the strength of labour market institutions. There is scarce evidence, 
mainly from cross-country studies, on the employment effects of the minimum wage 
during recessions and under different strictness of labour market regulation, and, in 
many cases, this evidence is rather mixed (Allegretto et al., 2011; Dolton and Bondibene, 
2012; Addison et al., 2013; Christl et al., 2018). 
Moreover, there is limited evidence on how minimum wages affected employment 
during the latest severe economic crisis in Europe. In particular, in some of the European 
countries hit the hardest from the crisis, there have been drastic decreases in minimum 
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wages (e.g., Ireland, Greece) in the face of wider and dramatic labour market 
deregulation. These decreases have been justified on the basis that they will help to 
mitigate the negative effects of the recession on the employment opportunities of the 
most affected groups, such as the youth and the low-skilled. This hypothesis, however, 
has not been rigorously investigated. It also hinges on the assumption that the 
employment effect of a decrease in the minimum wage is symmetric to that of an 
increase, as the neoclassical model of the labour market would predict. Nevertheless, 
this may not necessarily be the case due to asymmetry in behavioural responses to wage 
decreases relative to equivalent increases (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991).  
Finally, results of the few cross-country studies may be confounded by other differences 
across countries. Looking at a single country over time may abate this problem, but, to 
our knowledge, such study is missing. 
This paper aims to present such a study and address the aforementioned gaps in the 
literature looking at the case of Greece during the period between 2009 and 2017. There 
are many reasons why Greece offers a fruitful ground for such an investigation. First, it 
is a country with a relatively high minimum wage, close to the average of OECD 
countries, that have been increased regularly and at different rates (OECD, 2014). 
Second, since the economic crisis of 2008 the country has experienced an 
unprecedented recession that deepened over time and led to a loss of more that 25 
percent of per capita GDP by 2014 (Meghir et al., 2017). This, combined with other 
aspects of the Greek economy, triggered a debt crisis that led to the entry of the country 
to a structural adjustment program in May 2010 agreed between the Greek government 
on the one side and the IMF, the European Commission, and the European Central Bank 
on the other side. Third, as part of the structural adjustment program there has been a 
dramatic deregulation of labour market institutions, including a large reduction in the 
minimum wage in 2012 that was larger for those younger than 25 years of age, 
effectively introducing a youth subminimum.  
Finally, unlike other European countries, there has been limited evidence on the effects 
of minimum wages on wages and employment in Greece. Earlier studies provide time-
series evidence (Koutsogeorgopoulou, 1994; Karageorgiou, 2004), whereas a few more 
recent studies investigate the impact of the 2012 differential reduction in the minimum 
wage on employment dynamics among young individuals across the 25 years old 
threshold (Yannelis, 2014; Karakitsios, 2015; Kakoulidou et al., 2018). These studies, 
however, find conflicting evidence and do not provide evidence on how wages 
responded to the minimum wage reduction. This is possibly due to data limitations, as 
these studies use data from the Greek Labour Force Survey that does not include precise 
information on wages (up to 2015 wages were reported in bands). This is important, 
because examining wage responses to changes in the minimum wage is a pre-requisite 
of looking at effects of minimum wages on employment. Moreover, in contrast to 
minimum wage increases, in the case of a decrease it is not given that wages would 
change at all, and if so, if they would decline by more among low-wage workers. This is 
because the reduction in the minimum wage was combined with a decentralisation of 
collective bargaining, which was aimed at facilitating wage reductions across the wage 
distribution in the private sector. 
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We analyse the effects of minimum wages on wages and employment during the period 
between 2009 and 2017 in Greece using data from a random sample of employees in 
the private sector and their employers drawn from the Unified Social Security Authority 
(EFKA) records. This panel matched employer-employee data set has several advantages 
over other available data sources. First, it is the most precise source of information on 
individual wages that allows us to study the incidence and extent of wage spillovers that 
haven’t been previously studied. Second, in contrast to other studies, it enables us to 
examine directly both employees’ and employers’ responses to changes in minimum 
wages.  
We examine the effects of a range of changes in the minimum wage of different 
magnitudes, including two increases (one of 5.5 percent in 2009 and another one of 1.6 
percent in 2011) as well as a dramatic reduction that differed for those above and below 
25 years (22 and 32 percent respectively in 2012). These changes have been enacted at 
different points in the recession and under different strictness of labour market 
regulation.  
We leverage on the different sources of variation in minimum wages during this period, 
employing a range of estimators, such as difference-in-differences (DID), fixed effects 
(FE), and fixed effects Instrumental Variables (FEIV). We find a significant and positive 
effect of minimum wages on individual and firm average wages, as well as significant 
positive wage spill-overs that may extend, depending on the period, beyond the median 
wage. Nevertheless, we find no systematic evidence of a significant employment effect 
of minimum wages at any given period. In particular, we fail to find evidence that 
employment increased or decreased by more in periods and groups of employees or 
employers who have experienced the largest wage increases or decreases as a result of 
the minimum wage. Moreover, in the case of 2012 decrease, FEIV estimates suggest 
that, after 2012, firms with a higher share of youth, and thus a lower effective minimum 
wage, had significantly lower wages and employment, a finding consistent with a 
significant positive relationship between the level of the minimum wage and firm 
employment. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe the data set and 
present descriptive statistics. The following section then presents our estimation 
strategy, whereas the fourth section presents our results. Finally, the last section 
concludes.  
 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in our analysis were extracted from administrative records of the Unified 
Social Security Authority (EFKA) for the period between March 2009 and December 
2017. EFKA includes social security records of all private sector employees and 
employers and was introduced in January 2017 through unifying all different private 
sector social security organisations. EFKA conducts a monthly census of all employers in 
the private sector collecting information on monthly gross wages of all individual 
employees at the firm as well as key employee and employer characteristics and social 
security contributions. This data provide the most reliable source of wage information 
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in Greece, as employers are required by law to return the information every month and 
gross monthly wages for each employee should be recorded with precision at two 
decimal places.   
In our case, the sample included all employees in EFKA for whom the last two digits of 
the social security number matched a unique randomly selected two digit number. 
Records for these employees and their employers were drawn for the last month of 
every quarter, i.e., March, June, September, and December for the years between 2009 
and 2017. Therefore, all employees in the sample at any given period appear in the 
sample in the following periods through December 2017, unless they have exited EFKA. 
In the case that an employee from the sample exits EFKA and there is no other employee 
in the sample from the same firm, the firm is also dropped from the sample. This results 
in a panel matched employer-employee data where, at any given period, for each 
individual employee there is also employer information and for each employer there is 
information on at least one employee at the firm.  
Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics of private sector employees and firms4 
respectively for the full period (see also Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix for 
information on the occupation, industry, and region composition of the sample). The 
tables also present descriptive statistics separately for the months in the data that are 
just before and after the May 2009 and July 2011 minimum wage increases, as well as 
for the months just before and after the February 2012 minimum wage reduction, based 
on employees and firms in the balanced sample, i.e., those observed in the month 
before and after the change in the minimum wage.  
According to Table 1, around half of the employees in the sample are male, the average 
employee age is around 38 years with around 10 percent of employees being younger 
than 25 years old, whereas 77 percent are full-time and the average employee gross 
monthly wage is around €1080 in the full period. Moreover, Table 2 reveals quite similar 
averages along these aspects across firms, with the difference that the share of full time 
employees at the firm is around 70 percent and the average wage bill per employee at 
the firm is around €1200, slightly higher than the average employee wage, as it this 
includes bonuses and arrears on top of basic pay.5 Table 2 also indicates that the average 
firm in the sample during the full period has around 45 employees and that, on average, 
the share of employees with information on individual employee characteristics, 
including wages, at the firm is around 20 percent of total firm employment.6 
 
 
 
                                                      
4 EFKA records include employees in the so-called “wider” public sector that includes mainly employees 
in public sector enterprises. These employees, however, are not covered by the minimum wage, as they 
are paid according to the unified public sector payroll for which the lowest wage or salary is always higher 
than the minimum wage.  
5 The data does not include information that would allow us to separately identify the monthly wage bill 
accounted by base pay, excluding bonuses and arrears.  
6 For 11 percent of firms in the sample there is information on individual characteristics and outcomes of 
all employees, whereas the share of employees with information is below 10 percent for half of the firms 
in the sample.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Employee Characteristics in EFKA Data  
 2009-2017 March 
2009 
June  
2009 
June 
2011 
September 
2011 
December 
2011 
March 
2012 
Male 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Age 38.52 37.65 37.90 38.38 38.63 38.51 38.75 
(10.17) (10.15) (10.15) (9.90) (9.90) (9.73) (9.72) 
Under 25 
years 
 
0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 
(0.28) 
(0.30) (0.29) (0.27) (0.26) 
(0.25) 
(0.24) 
Full-time 
 
0.77 0.88 0.88 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.81 
(0.42) (0.33) (0.33) (0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.39) 
Gross 
monthly base 
pay 
1078.66 1268.95 1281.06 1277.80 1282.92 1286.13 1267.20 
(712.61) 
(704.15) (707.35) (693.31) (698.51) 
(714.36) 
(713.24) 
Ratio of 
minimum to  
median wage 
0.68 0.67 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.54 
Number of 
employees 
70,102 27,741 27,741 25,895 25,895 22,807 22,807 
Number of 
observations 
1,043,127 27,741 27,741 25,895 25,895 22,807 22,807 
Notes: Figures are averages with standard deviations in parentheses. All samples are restricted to 
employees in the private sector. The samples in 2009, 2011, and 2012 are restricted to employees in the 
balanced panel, i.e., those who are present in both months of any given year. Gross monthly base pay is 
in Euros. The ratio of minimum to median wage is calculated using the minimum wage for not married 
employees with up to 3 years of working experience in each period before 2012 and the adult minimum 
wage in 2012.  
 
 
Regarding the May 2009 minimum wage increase, when the minimum wage increased 
by 5.5 percent from €701.01 to €739.56 per month,7 as suggested by Table 1, between 
March and June 2009 there was an increase in the minimum wage also as a share of the 
median wage from 67 to 70 percent, as well as a slight increase in the average employee 
gross monthly wage (around 1 percent). There is also a more noticeable increase in the 
firm average monthly wage bill and the average monthly wage bill per employee, as 
indicated by Table 2. Nevertheless, the latter may not be attributed necessarily to the 
increase in the minimum wage, as during the summer months, when several employees 
take holiday leave, there is an associated leave bonus.8 Tables 1 and 2, however, suggest 
no noticeable change between June and September 2011, the months in the data just 
before and after July 2011 when the minimum wage increased by 1.6 percent from 
€739.56 to €751.39. This could be explained by the fact that this increase was rather 
small, as by then, the economic recession in Greece had deepened, and that, as 
suggested by Table 1, the minimum wage during this period seemed to have increased 
in line with median wages.  
 
                                                      
7 In fact, this is the minimum wage for white collar private sector employees who are not married and 
with up to 3 years of working experience. Minimum wage rates vary with marital status and years of 
working experience, and are set at daily rates for blue collar workers (see Kanellopoulos, 2015 and 
Kakoulidou et al., 2018 for details).  
8 This is half of the monthly employee salary. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics in EFKA Data  
 2009-2017 March  
2009 
June  
2009 
June  
2011 
September 
2011 
December 
2011 
March  
2012 
Share female 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 
(0.32) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) 
Share under 
25 
0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Share full-
time 
0.69 0.85 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.76 0.76 
(0.38) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.34) (0.35) 
Number of 
employees 
46.14 49.87 51.14 50.69 50.69 58.79 50.15 
(269.54) (294.11) (295.19) (279.45) (278.99) (313.33) (287.24) 
Share of 
employees 
with 
individual 
information 
 
0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.24 
(0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30) 
Monthly 
wage bill 
50736.49 45872.58 50063.70 54389.96 51785.57 93570.81 48680.80 
(132945.16) (107823.94) (119712.06) (130007.7) (120041.67) (210641.16) (120732.95) 
Monthly 
wage bill per 
employee 
 
1218.40 1151.97 1200.64 1235.95 1236.95 2110.42 1149.20 
(1124.40) (859.36) (723.22) (959.63) (696.43) (1327.49) (833.52) 
Number of 
firms 
80,426 16,437 16,437 15,457 15,457 13,778 13,778 
Number of 
observations 
698,001 16,437 16,437 15,457 15,457 13,778 13,778 
Notes: Figures are averages with standard deviations in parentheses. All samples are restricted to firms in 
the private sector. The samples in 2009, 2011, and 2012 are restricted to firms in the balanced panel, i.e., 
firms that are present in both months of any given year. Monthly wage bill includes base pay, bonuses, 
and arrears. Monthly wage bill and monthly wage bill per employee are in Euros.  
 
 
As far as the February 2012 reduction in the minimum wage, when the minimum wage 
decreased from €751.39 to €586.08 for those older than 25 and to €510.95 for those up 
to 25,9 Table 1 indicates that this led to a marked decline in the (adult) minimum wage 
relative to median earnings from 68 percent to 54 percent between December 2011 and 
March 2012. Thus, although in the same period there was a noticeable reduction in the 
average employee monthly wage (around 1.5 percent), as presented in Table 1, overall 
wages across the distribution declined by much less than the floor afforded by the 
minimum wage. Moreover, Table 2 suggests a marked decline in both the number of 
employees and the firm average monthly wage bill and average monthly wage bill per 
employee. Nevertheless, again, the former could be well attributed to the economic 
downturn during this period, whereas the latter could be explained by the fact that in 
December all employers pay an additional salary to employees as a Christmas bonus. 
                                                      
9 These two minima were the only two national minimum rates in place after February 2012, as the law 
through which the minimum wage reduction was enacted in 2012 also abolished the different minima 
based on marital status and working experience that were previously the case. The latter minima, 
however, were paid after 2012 by employers who were part of some of the major employers’ associations 
that chose to sign the national general collective agreement.  
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3. Empirical Strategy 
The key objectives of our analysis is to identify the impact of minimum wages on wages 
and employment. In order to achieve this, we employ two identification strategies. The 
first strategy is based on difference-in-differences (DID) estimation of the impact of the 
May 2009 and July 2011 increases in the minimum wage, as well as the February 2012 
decrease. The second strategy relies on the fact that the 2012 reduction was higher 
among those 25 years old or younger introducing, in this way, a lower minimum wage 
for youths.  
In particular, the first empirical strategy implements a differential trend adjusted DID 
estimator (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009) through estimating the following specification: 
 
∆𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖+𝜷𝟐
′ 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    (1) 
 
where ∆𝑂𝑖𝑡 is the change in the outcome of individual employee or firm 𝑖 between the 
initial period,  𝑡 − 1, and the following period, 𝑡, 𝑇𝑡 is an indicator taking the value 1 for 
observations drawn before and after a period when the minimum wage changed and 0 
for observations before and after a period when there was no change in the minimum 
wage, 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 is a vector of pre-treatment individual or firm characteristics, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is an 
error term. The variable 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖 is, the so called “wage gap”, a measure of treatment 
intensity that is defined by previous literature (e.g., Machin et al., 2003; Stewart, 2004), 
as follows: 
 
𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖 = 𝑀𝑊𝑡 − 𝑊𝑖
∗    (2) 
 
where, 𝑀𝑊𝑡 is the log level of the minimum wage in period 𝑡 (following period
10) and 
𝑊𝑖
∗ is the log level of the individual or firm wage in the absence of a (change in) minimum 
wage that aims to capture whether unit 𝑖 is low- or high-wage. In this way, 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖 provides 
a measure of the ‘bite’ of the minimum wage at the unit level.11 There are several 
potential measures of 𝑊𝑖
∗. For our purposes, we use the average individual wage across 
the different periods for which there is individual wage information or the mean firm-
level average wage across periods, based on the wages of all firm employees across 
periods. This measure minimises measurement error in 𝑊𝑖
∗ that may afflict other 
potential measures of 𝑊𝑖
∗, such as the individual wage or the average wage at the firm 
                                                      
10 In fact, for 2009 and 2011, when there were several minima in place that varied with marital status and 
working experience, we use the lowest of the several minimum wages, covering employees who are not 
married and have up to 3 years of working experience. This is because there is no information on marital 
status and working experience in the EFKA data and thus we cannot identify which of the different levels 
of the minimum wage each individual is eligible to receive. This is expected to underestimate the share of 
those directly affected by the minimum wage and thus the impact of minimum wage increases. In the 
case of 2012, the calculation of the “wage gap” is based on the adult minimum wage. 
11 In contrast to Stewart (2004), we do not restrict the “wage gap” variable to be zero for individuals paid 
above the level of the (new) minimum wage. This is firstly because we are interested in examining the 
extent of wage spillovers among sub-samples of not directly affected units, and secondly, as discussed 
previously, because it is not clear what unit is directly affected in the case of a decrease in the minimum 
wage. 
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at the initial period 𝑡 − 1, 𝑊𝑖𝑡−1, that is expected to lead to biased estimates (Autor et 
al., 2016; Georgiadis and Manning, 2018).12  
Equation (1) is suitable for estimating the impact of minimum wages on continuous 
outcomes. In the case of binary outcomes, such as the individual employment 
probability, the outcome of specification (1) can be denoted as Pr [𝐸𝑖𝑡+1 = 1|𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 1], 
that is the probability that the individual is employed in period 𝑡 + 1 conditional on 
being employed in period 𝑡. This suggests that in this case a linear probability model is 
estimated to assess the impact of the minimum wage on individual outcomes. A linear 
probability model was preferred due to its simplicity and straightforward interpretation 
(Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009).  
We can only, however, measure the individual conditional probability of employment 
imperfectly in our data. This is because, we only observe whether, at any given period, 
the individual is not employed in the private sector that does not only include 
unemployment, but also employment in the public sector and self-employment. We 
believe, however, that in the case of minimum wage increases, results of the impact of 
the minimum wage on the individual conditional probability of being employed in the 
private sector could be suggestive of employment effects of the minimum wage. This is 
likely to hold under the assumption that, given everything else the same, and given that 
an increase in the minimum wage increases pay in the private sector relative to 
alternative opportunities, it is less likely that a reduction in the probability of being 
employed in the private sector reflects voluntary quits and thus it is more likely to be 
attributed to involuntary separations. The same does not hold in the case of a minimum 
wage reduction that, on the one hand, may increase quits in the private sector and on 
the other hand may decrease involuntary separations. Therefore, given these two 
counteracting effects, analysis of the impact of the February 2012 minimum wage 
reduction on the individual conditional probability of remaining in the private sector is 
not expected to be informative of the employment effects of minimum wages arising 
from dismissals or job destruction. 
Estimation of equation (1) requires data on individuals or firms at four points in time, 
before and after a period when the minimum wage changed and a period when it did 
not. This allows one to relax the common trends assumption on which the validity of the 
DID estimator rests and instead to implement a “differential trend adjusted DID 
estimator” (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). This further enables one to test explicitly the 
key identifying assumption of common trends of the DID method and control for 
differential trends in the treatment and control group in the case that the assumption 
does not hold.  
The validity of the differential trend adjusted DID estimator, however, hinges on the 
assumption that trends in the control and treatment group in the period when the policy 
was not in place closely resemble differential trends in the two groups in the absence of 
the treatment. Following Blundell and Costa Dias (2009), we adjust for trends using the 
same period of the year, as that when the policy changed, in the most recent year when 
                                                      
12 Measurement error in 𝑊𝑖𝑡−1 is expected to lead to a positive bias in the OLS estimate of the coefficient 
of 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖 when the outcome is ∆𝑊𝑖𝑡−1, that is the change in the wage between  𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡. 
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there was no change in the minimum wage.13 For example, in the case that the period 
straddling the change in the minimum wage considered is that between December 2011 
and March 2012, the period between December 2010 and March 2011 is used to control 
for trends in the treatment and control group. Thus, the impact of the change in the 
minimum wage on the outcome is measured by 𝛽3 in equation (1), whereas the inclusion 
of 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖 allows to test, and control, for potential violation of the common trends 
assumption.  
The second identification strategy uses the February 2012 differential reduction in the 
minimum wage of those 25 years old or younger and those older than 25 years. In 
particular, in this case, one can estimate the impact of the change in the minimum wage 
on individual outcomes using, instead of 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖, a binary indicator that is 1 if the individual 
is 25 years old or younger at the post-treatment period and 0 otherwise. This is the 
strategy implemented by several recent studies (Yannelis, 2014; Karakitsios, 2015; 
Kakoulidou et al., 2018) to identify the employment effects of the February 2012 
minimum wage reduction in Greece.  
Similarly, the impact of the minimum wage reduction on firm outcomes can be 
estimated by replacing 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑖 with a measure of the share of employees at the firm who 
are under 25 years old in the period before the change in the policy. This is expected to 
reflect the fact that the “effective” minimum wage across firms varies with the share of 
employees who are 25 years old or younger. One potential problem of this is that the 
share of those under the age of 25 at the firm prior to the change in the policy may 
respond to the change in the minimum wage if, for example, employers substitute 
youths for adults in anticipation of the change in the minimum wage. We believe, 
however, that this is unlikely to be a concern in the case of the February 2012 minimum 
wage reduction, as the change in the policy was not announced publicly in advance of 
becoming effective and thus there was not sufficient time for employers to adjust 
outcomes in anticipation of the change (see also Yannelis, 2014, for a list of other 
reasons ruling out an anticipation effect). Nevertheless, in our empirical analysis we also 
try to document whether this was indeed the case.  
Another estimation strategy using the introduction of a lower subminimum wage in 
February 2012 is implemented employing the following specification:  
𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑎25𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2012 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑎25𝑖𝑡 + 𝜶𝟑
′ 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     (3) 
where 𝑊𝑖𝑡 is the outcome of individual 𝑖 in period 𝑡, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑎25𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of whether 
the individual 𝑖 is older than 25 years in period 𝑡, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2012 is a binary indicator of 
whether the observation is drawn after February 2012, when the lower youth minimum 
has been in place,  𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of individual characteristics in period 𝑡, 𝛾𝑖  denotes 
time-invariant individual characteristics, 𝛿𝑡 stands for time effects, and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an error 
term. In this case, the effect of the treatment is captured by 𝛼2, whereas the inclusion 
of term 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑎25𝑖𝑡 aims to control for any systematic differences in the outcomes of 
                                                      
13 Ideally one would like to adjust for differential trends using a recent period when no minimum wage is 
in place. This, however, is not possible, in our case, as minimum wages in Greece have been continuously 
in place since 1938 (Kanellopoulos, 2015).  
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those 25 or younger and those older than 25 in the absence of the treatment. Equation 
(3) is estimated using a fixed effects panel data estimator.  
This approach aims to identify the effect of an increase in the minimum wage on 
individual outcomes using the change in the level of the effective minimum wage over 
time among individuals who cross the 25 years old threshold. The key identifying 
assumption is that the relationship between the outcome and factors other than the 
minimum wage that may change sharply around the 25 years old cut off has not shifted 
after 2012. This is likely to hold, as no other legislation in Greece influencing labour 
market outcomes changes sharply around this threshold14 and none of the labour 
market reforms introduced after February 2012 determined differential provisions 
around the 25 years old cut off (Yannelis, 2012). Nevertheless, we also include a 
quadratic in age, also interacted with the indicator of whether the observation is drawn 
after February 2012, in the vector of controls, 𝑿𝒊𝒕, to account for the fact that the 
outcome, e.g., individual wages, may change nonlinearly with age, and that this 
relationship may have shifted after February 2012. As above, the impact of the minimum 
wage on the probability of employment could be estimated by replacing 𝑊𝑖𝑡 with 
Pr [𝐸𝑖𝑡+1 = 1|𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 1].  
 Replacing individual with firm level outcomes and characteristics as well as 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑎25𝑖𝑡 with the share of employees who are under 25 years in (3) and estimating the 
resulting equation using a fixed effects panel data estimator allows one to estimate the 
impact of the minimum wage on firms. A key concern, however, in this case, is that the 
share of those under 25 at the firm is endogenous, either due to measurement error or 
because it is expected to respond to transitory shocks affecting firm outcomes, such as 
wages. In order to address this, we estimate equation (3) for firm level outcomes using 
Instrumental Variables (IV) employing as instruments for the share of those under 25 at 
the firm the number of employees who were previously employed at the firm and cross 
the 25 years old threshold at any given point in time, expressed as a share of firm’s total 
employment.15 The latter is expected to be negatively correlated with the share of those 
below 25 years old and it is expected to be a valid instrument provided that it is plausibly 
exogenous and unanticipated by the employer. This hinges on the assumption that 
employers, particularly in larger firms, are unlikely to know their employees’ birthdays. 
We provide a test of this assumption in the following section by looking at whether 
employers respond in anticipation of the fact that some of their employees may cross 
the 25 years old threshold at some future period and thus become eligible for a higher 
minimum wage. 
 
 
 
                                                      
14 But even if there has been, this would be captured by 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑎25𝑎𝑖𝑡  in (3). 
15 This is based on the number of employees crossing the age threshold for whom there is individual age 
information in the data. Therefore, this is likely to underestimate the actual share of all those at the firm 
at any given period crossing the age threshold. 
 
 
11 
4. Results 
3a. May 2009 and July 2011 Increase in the Minimum Wage 
Tables 3 and 4 present differential trend adjusted DID estimates of the impact of the 
May 2009 and July 2011 increase in the minimum wage on individual and firm outcomes 
respectively. In particular, Table 3 includes results of the impact of the minimum wage 
increase on individual wages and the probability that the individual remains in the EFKA 
data that is interpreted, in our case, as remaining employed in the private sector, 
conditional on being employed in the private sector in the period before the minimum 
wage increase.  
Results in Table 3 suggest a positive, but insignificant effect of the 2009 increase on 
individual wages in the full sample. This effect is larger in magnitude and significant for 
directly affected employees (those paid below the new minimum wage) and suggest 
that those with 1 percent lower initial wages relative to the average experienced a 0.092 
percent higher wage growth as a result of the increase. There are also significant positive 
spill-over effects on the wages of those paid above the new minimum wage and below 
the median wage in March 2009, but no effects on the wages of employees paid above 
the median wage.  
There is also some evidence that, among those directly affected, the probability of 
remaining in the private sector is significantly lower as a result of the 2009 minimum 
wage in employees whose wages had to increase by more to comply with the new 
minimum wage. In particular, estimates suggest that, as a result of the minimum wage 
increase, among those paid initially below the new minimum wage, those paid an initial 
wage that was relatively lower by 1 percent than the average had a 0.093 percent lower 
probability of remaining employed in the private sector compared to those paid initially 
a wage equal to the new minimum wage. There are no significant effects of the 
minimum wage increase, however, on the individual conditional probability of 
remaining employed in the private sector after the increase among employees who have 
experienced significant positive wage spill-overs as a result of the minimum wage 
increase. Results in Table 4, however, that presents effects of the 2009 minimum wage 
increase on firm level outcomes are not in line with effects on individual outcomes. In 
particular, estimates in Table 4 suggest no significant effects of the 2009 increase on 
firm average log wage and log number of employees. The former result could be 
explained by the fact that, in our case, the average firm wage measure is imprecise, as 
it is based on wage information of only a share of employees at the firm.  
As far as the 2011 minimum wage increase is concerned, results in Table 3 show a weakly 
significant and positive effect on individual wages in the full sample of private sector 
employees, but no significant effects on the different sub-samples. There is some 
indication, however, that effects on individual wages, are larger in magnitude among 
directly affected employees. There is also a significant reduction in the probability that 
an individual paid above the 2011 minimum wage in June 2011 and below the level of 
the median wage in March 2011, before the increase becomes effective, remains 
employed in the private sector. On the other hand, as was the case for the 2009 policy 
change, results in Table 4 indicate no significant effects on firm wages and employment 
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from the 2011 increase in the minimum wage. These results could be partially explained 
by the fact that the 2011 increase was relatively small (1.6%) compared to previous 
years, such as that in 2009. Consistent with evidence presented in the previous section, 
the ‘bite’ of the minimum wage relative to the median wage remained unchanged 
during this period, and this is why it may be difficult to detect any effect on individual 
and firm outcomes. 
 
Table 3: Differential Trend Adjusted Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of the 
May 2009 and July 2011 Increases in the Minimum Wage on Individual Employee Outcomes  
 All Paid below the New 
Minimum Wage in 
the Initial Period  
Paid above the New 
Minimum Wage and 
below the Median 
Wage in the Initial 
Period 
Paid above 
the Median 
Wage in the 
Initial Period 
 Mar 2009-Jun 2009  
 Individual Log Monthly Wage  
Gap 0.005      0.092***       0.058*** 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.028) (0.021) (0.007) 
Observations 50,854 7,461 14,232 27,085 
 Conditional Individual Probability of Remaining in the Private Sector 
Gap -0.002      -0.093*** 0.029 -0.007 
 (0.005) (0.019) (0.020) (0.006) 
Observations 56,150 9,899 15,742 28,293 
                                         Jun 2011-Sep 2011 
                                  Individual Log Monthly Wage 
Gap   0.010* 0.042 -0.039 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.027) (0.024) (0.008) 
Observations 51,623 8,749 14,773 28,101 
    Conditional Individual Probability of Remaining in the Private Sector 
Gap 0.0001 0.004   -0.047** 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.020) (0.021) (0.006) 
Observations 56,492 11,157 16,136 29,199 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 
10%. The Gap variable is the difference between the log minimum wage for those not married and with 
up to 3 years of working experience in the final period and the mean log wage of the individual employee 
based on all wages available for this employee between 2009 and 2017. In all specifications the sample is 
restricted to employees in the private sector. All specifications include controls for full-time vs part-time 
employment, employer’s industry (1 digit) and region, and employees’ occupation (1 digit), all measured 
in the initial period, but coefficients estimates are not reported. Differential trend adjusted Difference-in-
Differences estimates are produced by pooling observations before and after the minimum wage increase 
and before and after the same period in the most recent year at which the minimum wage did not change. 
The latter include the period between March and June 2010 and between June and September 2010 for 
the 2009 and 2011 minimum wage increase respectively.  
 
Overall, our results on the impact of minimum wage increases in 2009 and 2011 seem 
to show some significant positive effects on wages of low-wage workers, but no 
systematic effect on employment at both the individual and firm level. We also 
investigated whether employment adjustments to wage increases arising from the 
minimum wage may have taken more time to materialise by looking at longer-run 
impacts through the end of the year the minimum changed, but we fail to find either 
significantly larger wage increases or significant employment effects (these results are 
available from the authors upon request). Finally, results from all estimated 
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specifications are consistent with differential trends in wages and employment in low- 
and high-wage individuals and firms (not reported here), supporting our choice of the 
differential trend adjusted DID estimator as our preferred estimator.  
 
Table 4: Differential Trend Adjusted Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of the 
May 2009 and July 2011 Increases in the Minimum Wage on Firm Level Outcomes  
 All Low-Wage 
 (average wage in the initial 
period below median) 
High-Wage  
(average wage in the initial 
period above median) 
 Mar 2009-Jun 2009 
 Average Log Monthly Wage 
Gap 0.005 0.026 0.006 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.014) 
Observations 29,185 11,376 17,809 
                                                  Log Number of Employees 
Gap -0.003 -0.001 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.011) 
Observations 29,669 11,693 17,976 
                                                         Jun 2011-Sep 2011 
                                                  Average Log Monthly Wage 
Gap 0.003 0.002 0.013 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.013) 
Observations 29,800 11,301 18,499 
 Log Number of Employees 
Gap 0.008 0.019 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) 
Observations 30,204 13,380 16,824 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 
10%. The Gap variable is the difference between the log minimum wage for those not married with up to 
3 years of working experience in the final period and the mean log average firm wage calculated using the 
wages of all employees in the firm between 2009 and 2017. In all specifications the sample is restricted 
to firms in the private sector. All specifications include controls for the share of full-time, the share of 
employees under 25, and the share of female employees at the firm, industry (1 digit), and region, all 
measured in the initial period, but coefficients estimates are not reported. Differential trend adjusted 
Difference-in-Differences estimates are produced by pooling observations before and after the minimum 
wage increase and before and after the same period in the most recent year at which the minimum wage 
did not change. The latter include the period between March and June 2010 and between June and 
September 2010 for the 2009 and 2011 minimum wage increase respectively.  
 
 
3b. February 2012 Reduction in the Minimum Wage and Introduction of a Youth Sub-
Minimum  
Estimation results of the effect of the 2012 minimum wage reduction on individual and 
firm level outcomes are presented in Tables 5 to 10. Table 5 presents differential trend 
adjusted DID estimation of equation (1) measuring the impact of the minimum wage 
reduction on individual wages in the short-run (March 2012) and the longer run (through 
to December 2012). This is done to account for the possibility that, in contrast to 
minimum wage increases, where employers are obliged by law to increase wages of 
those directly affected immediately after the increase becomes effective, in the case of 
a minimum wage reduction, employers may choose not to decrease wages at all or to 
decrease them at a later point.  
 
 
14 
Results presented in Table 5 suggest that there were significant reductions of wages of 
private sector employees as a result of the February 2012 minimum wage decrease and 
that these were larger among low-wage individuals, i.e., individuals with wages nearer 
to the level of the (adult) minimum wage in February 2012. However, as is clear in the 
results, the reduction in paid wages was not instantaneous and manifested with some 
hysteresis: between December 2011 and December 2012, i.e., 10 months after the 
policy change, the decline in individual wages was 8 times larger than that estimated 
immediately after the policy change (March 2012) and almost 1.5 times larger than that 
estimated for the period to September 2012. 
 
Table 5: Differential Trend Adjusted Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of the 
February 2012 Decrease in the Minimum Wage on Individual Log Wage (Impact Measure-
Gap)  
 All Paid the Old 
Minimum Wage or 
less in the Initial 
Period 
Paid above the Old 
Minimum Wage and 
below Median Wage 
in the Initial Period 
Paid above 
the Median 
Wage in the 
Initial Period 
 Dec 2011-Mar 2012  
Gap -0.008* 0.032     -0.074***   -0.019** 
 (0.004) (0.023) (0.022) (0.008) 
Observations 45,535 8,191 12,958 24,386 
                                        Dec 2011-Jun 2012 
Gap      -0.024***    0.064**     -0.092***      -0.061*** 
 (0.006) (0.032) (0.029) (0.008) 
Observations 41,592 6,565 11,724 23,303 
                                         Dec 2011-Sep 2012 
Gap      -0.042***       0.114***     -0.215***     -0.083*** 
 (0.006) (0.034) (0.031) (0.009) 
Observations 38,867 5,644 10,818 22,405 
                                        Dec 2011-Dec 2012 
Gap     -0.064*** 0.020     -0.328***     -0.110*** 
 (0.007) (0.039) (0.032) (0.010) 
Observations 36,511 5,020 9,974 21,517 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 
10%.  
The Gap variable is the difference between the log minimum wage for those above 25 years old in the 
final period and the mean log wage of the individual employee based on all wage observations available 
for this employee between 2009 and 2017. In all specifications the sample is restricted to employees in 
the private sector. All specifications include controls for full-time vs part-time employment, employer’s 
industry (1 digit) and region, and employees’ occupation (1 digit), all measured in the initial period, but 
coefficients estimates are not reported. Differential trend adjusted Difference-in-Differences estimates 
are produced by pooling observations before and after before and after the 2012 reduction in the 
Minimum wage and before and after the same period one year before the change in policy occurred. 
 
Estimates in Table 5 also indicate a significant effect of the minimum wage reduction on 
wages of higher-wage employees, i.e., those paid above the old level of the minimum 
wage that also becomes larger in magnitude over time. This effect reduces in magnitude 
as we move up the individual wage distribution in the private sector. In particular, results 
suggest that, among employees paid initially between the old minimum wage and the 
median wage, those with 1 percent lower wages relative to the average had, on average, 
a 0.074 percent higher wage reduction between December 2011 and March 2012 and a 
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0.328 percent higher wage reduction between December 2011 and December 2012. The 
same figures were 0.02 and 0.11 percent respectively among those paid above the 
median wage before the reform. We also find that, in the case of those paid the old 
minimum wage or below before the reduction,16 the relationship between the gap and 
change in wages is insignificant or positive and significant, suggesting either similar 
reductions among relatively high- and low-paid employees in this range, or that there 
were higher reductions among those with wages nearer to the old MW before the 
minimum wage reduction becomes effective. 
Table 6 presents results of the impact of the minimum wage reduction on individual 
wages using as a treatment indicator whether the individual is younger or older than 25 
years. This aims to identify whether the differential reduction in the minimum wage for 
youths and adults resulted in significant differential wage reductions between the two 
groups. 
 
Table 6: Differential Trend Adjusted Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of the 
February 2012 Decrease in the Minimum Wage on Individual Log Wage (Impact Measure-25 
Years Old or Younger) 
 All Paid the Old Minimum 
Wage or less in the 
Initial Period 
Paid above the Old 
Minimum Wage and 
below Median Wage 
in the Initial Period 
Paid above 
the Median 
Wage in the 
Initial Period 
 Dec 2011-Mar 2012  
25 years old or 
younger  
-0.017 -0.039* -0.003 0.010 
(0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.036) 
Observations 45,469 8,170 12,943 24,356 
                                        Dec 2011-Jun 2012 
25 years old or 
younger 
-0.015 -0.015 -0.007 -0.018 
(0.015) (0.031) (0.016) (0.033) 
Observations 41,529 6,543 11,711 23,275 
                                         Dec 2011-Sep 2012 
25 years old or 
younger 
-0.033* -0.024 -0.035* -0.019 
(0.018) (0.035) (0.021) (0.046) 
Observations 38,810 5,627 10,805 22,378 
                                        Dec 2011-Dec 2012 
25 years old or 
younger 
     -0.055***    -0.092** -0.032 0.042 
(0.019) (0.038) (0.021) (0.069) 
Observations 36,454 5,004 9,962 21,488 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 
10%.  
In all specifications the sample is restricted to employees in the private sector. All specifications include 
controls for full-time vs part-time employment, employer’s industry (1 digit) and region, and employees’ 
occupation (1 digit), all measured in the initial period, but coefficients estimates are not reported. 
Differential trend adjusted Difference-in-Differences estimates are produced by pooling observations 
before and after before and after the 2012 reduction in the Minimum wage and before and after the same 
period one year before the change in policy occurred. 
                                                      
16 Wages below the old minimum wage may be explained by part-time employment, or by the fact that 
some full-time employees started work or leave the firm at some point during the month, or by non-
compliance.  
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Figure 1 aims to provide a test of the common trends assumption in this case, by plotting 
average log wages of the treatment and control group between 2009 and 2017 using 
the EFKA data. The patterns in the figure suggest that the assumption of parallel trends 
is likely to be violated in this case. This provides further support to the choice of 
differential trend adjusted DID estimator implemented through OLS estimation of 
equation (1) as our preferred estimator. 
Results in Table 6 show that significant larger reductions in the wages of youth compared 
to those of adults, as a result of the differential reduction in the minimum wage for the 
two groups, materialised in the longer run, and are significant only among low-wage 
employees. In particular, estimates suggest that among employees paid initially at or 
below the old minimum wage, those 25 years old or younger experienced, on average, 
9.2 percent higher wage reductions compared to older than 25 years between 
December 2011 and December 2012. These results suggest that the utilisation of the 
youth subminimum by employers became more prevalent over-time, but it did not lead 
to differential wage reductions between youths and adults among higher-wage 
employees. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Log Average Monthly Wage of Employees under 25 and 25 and Older, 2009-2017 
 
Source: EFKA, 2009-2017, employees in the private sector. 
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Figure 2: The Average Share of Employees under 25 Years Old at the Firm, 2009-2017 
 
Source: EFKA, 2009-2017, firms in the private sector. 
 
 
Tables 7 and 8 present OLS estimation results of equation (1) measuring the impact of 
the minimum wage reduction and introduction of a lower minimum wage for youth on 
the firm level average log wage. Results in Table 7 reveal a similar pattern to those in 
Table 5 of the effects on individual wages. In particular, estimates suggest that there 
were significant reductions in firm level average wages in the private sector realised also 
among high-wage private sector employers, i.e., those with average log wage above the 
median, with higher reductions, in this group, among relatively lower-wage firms. Again, 
consistent with the results at the individual level, our results suggest that among low-
wage firms, i.e., those with a log average wage below the median, reductions resulting 
from the decrease in the minimum wage did not differ across employers with different 
initial average wages.  
 
Moreover, Table 8 suggests that there were no significantly different changes in wages 
among firms with different shares of employees who are under 25 years old. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of these effects becomes larger in the longer-run that is in 
line with the pattern identified in the case of individual wages suggesting that employers 
are more likely to utilise the lower minimum wage for youth over time. In contrast, we 
find no support for the pattern that this was more likely among lower-wage employers. 
As discussed in the previous section, adjustments of the share of youth at the firm in 
anticipation of the larger reduction in the minimum wage for this age group would 
invalidate the differential trend adjusted DID estimator using the share of youth prior to 
the minimum wage reduction as a measure of the ‘bite’ of the minimum wage at the 
firm. Evidence whether this was the case is provided in Figure 2 that plots the average 
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share of those under 25 years old or younger at the firm between 2009 and 2017. The 
figure shows that the share of under 25, despite some seasonal variation, was 
systematically decreasing through to just after 2012, remained relatively stable from 
March 2012 to March 2013, when it fell slightly, and started increasing noticeably after 
this time and through to the end of 2017. This evidence does not support that employers 
may substitute youth for adult employees in anticipation of the introduction of a lower 
minimum wage for youth in February 2012.  
 
 
Table 7: Differential Trend Adjusted Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of the 
February 2012 Minimum Wage Decrease on Firm Average Log Monthly Wages (Impact 
Measure-Gap) 
 All Low-Wage 
 (below median in Dec 2011) 
High-Wage  
(above median in Dec 2011) 
 Dec 2011-Mar 2012 
Gap -0.004 0.001    -0.033** 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.013) 
Observations 25,975 11,734 14,241 
 Dec 2011-Jun 2012 
Gap   -0.018** 0.013      -0.093*** 
(0.009) (0.019) (0.015) 
Observations 28,899 12,250 16,649 
 Dec 2011-Sep 2012 
Gap      -0.029*** 0.024     -0.138*** 
(0.010) (0.023) (0.018) 
Observations 21,072 8,447 12,625 
 Dec 2011-Dec 2012 
Gap      -0.054*** -0.013      -0.182*** 
(0.010) (0.024) (0.016) 
Observations 19,487 7,596 11,891 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 
10%. The Gap variable is the difference between the log minimum wage for those older than 25 years 
after in the final period and the mean log average firm wage calculated using the wages of all employees 
in the firm between 2009 and 2017. In all specifications the sample is restricted to firms in the private 
sector. All specifications include controls for the share of full-time, the share of employees under 25, and 
the share of female employees at the firm, industry (1 digit), and region, all measured in the initial period, 
but coefficients estimates are not reported. Differential trend adjusted Difference-in-Differences 
estimates are produced by pooling observations before and after before and after the 2012 reduction in 
the Minimum wage and before and after the same period one year before the change in policy occurred. 
 
 
Tables 9 and 10 present results of the employment effects of the minimum wage 
reduction at the firm level.17 Estimates in this case do not indicate a systematic 
relationship between firm employment and the minimum wage. In particular, there is 
no evidence that there were either significantly higher employment gains or losses in 
periods and among employers for whom wage reductions were the largest. The same 
holds for firms with relatively higher shares of youth in employment for which the 
‘effective’ minimum wage after 2012 is lower. In Table 9, however, there is some 
                                                      
17 Note that, for the reasons discussed in the previous sub-section, we refrain from estimating the impact 
of the minimum wage reduction on the individual conditional probability of remaining employed in the 
private sector. 
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indication that employment in the full sample increases in the long-run (between 
December 2011 and December 2012) among firms with higher share of youth and that 
this pattern is to the opposite direction of the pattern documented for the changes in 
wages in Table 8.  
 
 
Table 8: Differential Trend Adjusted Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of the 
February 2012 Minimum Wage Decrease on Firm Average Log Monthly Wages (Impact 
Measure-Firm Share of Youth) 
 All Low-Wage 
 (below median in Dec 2011) 
High-Wage  
(above median in Dec 2011) 
 Dec 2011-Mar 2012 
Share of employees 
under 25 years in Dec 
2011 
-0.011 -0.035 0.035 
(0.026) (0.031) (0.047) 
Observations 25,975 11,734 14,241 
 Dec 2011-Jun 2012 
Share of employees 
under 25 years in Dec 
2011 
-0.017 -0.034 -0.019 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.058) 
Observations 22,941 9,611 13,330 
 Dec 2011-Sep 2012 
Share of employees 
under 25 years in Dec 
2011 
-0.032 -0.032 -0.110 
(0.033) (0.039) (0.069) 
Observations 21,072 8,447 12,625 
 Dec 2011-Dec 2012 
Share of employees 
under 25 years in Dec 
2011 
-0.053 -0.059 -0.073 
(0.044) (0.053) (0.076) 
Observations 23,760 9,693 14,067 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 
10%. In all specifications the sample is restricted to firms in the private sector. All specifications include 
controls for the share of full-time and the share of female employees at the firm, industry (1 digit), and 
region, all measured in the initial period, but coefficients estimates are not reported. Differential trend 
adjusted Difference-in-Differences estimates are produced by pooling observations before and after 
before and after the 2012 reduction in the Minimum wage and before and after the same period one year 
before the change in policy occurred. 
 
Tables 11 and 12 present fixed effects (FE) estimation results of equation (3) for 
individual and firm level outcomes respectively. Results presented in Table 11 are 
consistent with significantly higher wages among youth who cross the 25 years old 
threshold and become eligible for the (higher) adult minimum wage. In particular, 
estimates suggest that young employees who became 25 years old after 2012, had, on 
average, 5.4 percent higher wages compared than those younger than 25. Results are 
also consistent with significant effects among youth who are directly affected, i.e., those 
paid below the adult minimum wage, but also significant wage spill-overs extending to 
those with wages above the level of the median wage in December 2011.18  
                                                      
18 We also extended the model to account for lead and lag effects of becoming eligible for the adult 
minimum wage among youth employees on wages in order to check whether wage increases take time 
to take effect and/or whether employers may provide increases in anticipation of this change in eligibility 
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Table 9: Differential Trend Adjusted Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of the 
February 2012 Minimum Wage Decrease on Firm Log Number of Employees (Impact Measure- 
Gap) 
 All Low-Wage 
 (below median in Dec 2011) 
High-Wage  
(above median in Dec 2011) 
 Dec 2011-Mar 2012 
Gap -0.009 0.001 0.011 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.015) 
Observations 26,325 11,982 14,343 
 Dec 2011-Jun 2012 
Gap -0.001 0.012 0.002 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.016) 
Observations 23,335 9,887 13,448 
 Dec 2011-Sep 2012 
Gap 0.015     0.044** 0.012 
(0.011) (0.022) (0.017) 
Observations 21,415 8,662 12,753 
 Dec 2011-Dec 2012 
Gap 0.015   0.038* 0.012 
(0.010) (0.020) (0.016) 
Observations 20,691 8,252 12,439 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 
10%. The Gap variable is the difference between the log minimum wage for those older than 25 years 
after in the final period and the mean log average firm wage calculated using the wages of all employees 
in the firm between 2009 and 2017. In all specifications the sample is restricted to firms in the private 
sector. All specifications include controls for the share of full-time, the share of employees under 25, and 
the share of female employees at the firm, industry (1 digit), and region, all measured in the initial period, 
but coefficients estimates are not reported. Differential trend adjusted Difference-in-Differences 
estimates are produced by pooling observations before and after before and after the 2012 reduction in 
the Minimum wage and before and after the same period one year before the change in policy occurred. 
 
 
Results of the effect of crossing the 25 years old threshold on the individual conditional 
probability of remaining employed in the private sector, show a significant and negative 
effect in the full sample, and negative, but insignificant effects in the different sub-
samples of low- and high-wage employees. This may provide an indication that the 
youth subminimum introduction have promoted youth employment opportunities.19  
 Turning to the effects at the firm level presented in Table 12, fixed effects estimates 
suggest that a higher share of youth at the firm after February 2012 is associated with 
significantly lower firm average wages and significantly higher firm-level employment, 
as measured by the log number of employees. These effects, however, do not survive 
                                                      
(see Table A.3 in the Appendix for details). Results of the extended model suggest that wage increases are 
contemporaneous to the change in eligibility, but for higher-wage individuals take effect, on average, a 
year after these individuals cross the 25 years old threshold. A speculation here could be that these effects 
may suggest time consuming negotiations regarding a pay rise between these employees and their 
employers. We also find no systematic evidence that wages adjusted in anticipation of the change in 
eligibility. 
19 Extending the model to account for gradual adjustments or anticipation effects in the probability of 
remaining employed in the private sector produce insignificant estimated coefficients of 
contemporaneous, as well as lead and lag terms (see Table A.4 in the Appendix for details). 
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when we control for the possible endogeneity of the share of youth employment at the 
firm. In the fixed effects instrumental variables (FEIV) model, the relationship between 
the effective minimum wage at the firm (as measured by the share of youth in firm 
employment) and firm average wage after February 2012 remains negative but is now 
insignificant.20 Moreover, FEIV estimates of the relationship between the share of youth 
at the firm and firm employment are now negative and significant suggesting that firms 
with 1 percent higher share of employees under age 25 than the average had 1.2 percent 
lower employment after 2012, as a result of a lower effective minimum wage.  
 
Table 10: Differential Trend Adjusted Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact of the 
February 2012 Minimum Wage Decrease on Firm Log Number of Employees (Impact Measure-
Firm Share of Youth) 
 All Low-Wage 
 (below median in Dec 2011) 
High-Wage  
(above median in Dec 2011) 
 Dec 2011-Mar 2012 
Share of employees 
under 25 years in Dec 
2011 
-0.011 0.033 -0.149 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.093) 
Observations 26,325 11,982 14,343 
 Dec 2011-Jun 2012 
Share of employees 
under 25 years in Dec 
2011 
0.009 0.052 -0.152* 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.085) 
Observations 23,335 9,887 13,448 
 Dec 2011-Sep 2012 
Share of employees 
under 25 years in Dec 
2011 
0.022 0.026 -0.012 
(0.041) (0.045) (0.091) 
Observations 21,415 8,662 12,753 
 Dec 2011-Dec 2012 
Share of employees 
under 25 years in Dec 
2011 
0.058 0.062 0.037 
(0.037) (0.043) (0.078) 
Observations 20,691 8,252 12,439 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 
10%. In all specifications the sample is restricted to firms in the private sector. All specifications include 
controls for the share of full-time and the share of female employees at the firm, industry (1 digit), and 
region, all measured in the initial period, but coefficients estimates are not reported. Differential trend 
adjusted Difference-in-Differences estimates are produced by pooling observations before and after 
before and after the 2012 reduction in the Minimum wage and before and after the same period one year 
before the change in policy occurred. 
 
A comparison of FEIV and FE estimates suggest a large positive bias in the FE estimates 
that could imply that in the face of positive shocks to firm wages and employment the 
share of youth employees expands. The fourth and seventh column of Table 12 present 
FE estimation of the reduced form specification that estimates the relationship between 
                                                      
20 Given the large magnitude of the FEIV estimated coefficient of the interaction of the share of youth at 
the firm and the indicator of whether the observation is drawn after 2012, it is likely that the lack of 
significance of the FEIV estimates is due to the large standard errors arising from the inefficiency of IV. 
This is despite the fact that the instruments strongly predict the endogenous variables, as indicated by a 
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic of 50. 
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firm wages and employment and the instrument. Results, albeit insignificant, are 
consistent with higher average wages and lower employment in firms in which a higher 
share of employees turns 25 at any given period and for which the effective minimum 
wage is higher. On the whole, this is consistent with monopsony and related search 
models, in which, there is a range of wages in which employment is supply-determined, 
and thus higher wages allow firms to expand employment (Manning, 2003). 
Alternatively, this could also reconcile with efficiency wage models consistent with a 
wage-monitoring trade-off, where lower wages lead to increase in shirking and thus 
monitoring intensity should be increased, through reducing the size of workforce, to 
deter shirking (Georgiadis, 2013). 
 
Table 11: Fixed Effects (FE) Estimates of the Effect of the Minimum Wage on Individual 
Outcomes, 2009-2017 
 All  Wages at or 
below the Adult 
Minimum Wage 
after Feb 2012 
Wages above the 
Adult Minimum 
Wage after Feb 
2012 and below the 
Median Wage in 
Dec 2011 
Wages above the 
Median Wage in Dec 
2011 
 Log Monthly Wage 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
     0.054***     0.039**      0.015***       0.063*** 
(0.009) (0.018) (0.004) (0.010) 
Older than 25 -0.007 -0.004 0.001     -0.025*** 
(0.007) (0.016) (0.004) (0.007) 
Observations 938,434 236,058 330,559 371,817 
                Conditional Individual Probability of Remaining in the Private Sector 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
    -0.022*** -0.010 -0.009 -0.019 
(0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) 
Older than 25       0.027*** 0.006       0.014*** -0.011* 
(0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) 
Observations 911,673 225,882 321,021 364,770 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant 
at 5%, *significant at 10%. In all specifications the sample is restricted to employees in the private sector. 
All specifications include a list of controls, but coefficients estimates for these are not reported. Controls 
in the  specifications of log monthly wages include year/month dummies, a quadratic in age, employer’s 
industry (1 digit) and region, and employee’s occupation (1 digit), all measured contemporaneously to 
individual wages and interactions of all controls with whether the observation was drawn after 2012. 
Controls in the specifications of individual probability of remaining in the private sector are the same as 
those in the specifications for monthly wages, but controls for employer’s industry (1 digit) and region, 
and employee’s occupation (1 digit), are measured in the previous period (3 months). 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the validity of the instruments hinges on the 
assumption that the share of employees turning 25 at any given period is exogenous and 
unanticipated by employers. In order to investigate this further, we also extended the 
reduced form model presented in Table 12 to include leads and lags of the key causing 
variable of interest.21 Results of FE estimation indicate only a significant effect of the 
                                                      
21 We only present estimation results of the reduced form mainly because, due to the endogeneity of the 
share of those under 25 at the firm, FE estimates of the structural equation are not expected to be valid. 
We also estimated the extended model with FEIV, but this did not produce valid results due to weak 
instruments potentially arising from the large number of endogenous variables (Shea, 1997). 
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lagged two periods measure of the share of those under 25 at the firm (see Table A.5 in 
the Appendix for details).22   
 
Table 12: Fixed Effects (FE) and Fixed Effects Instrumental Variables (FEIV) Estimates of the 
Effect of Minimum Wage on Firm-Level Outcomes, 2009-2017 
              Average Log Monthly Wage Log Number of Employees 
 FE FEIV FE FE FEIV FE 
Share of 
employees 
under 25 x 
after Feb 
2012 
    -
0.121*** -0.613 
      0.496***   -1.221**  
(0.017) (0.393)  (0.025) (0.482)  
Share of 
employees 
under 25 
0.002 0.250        
0.206*** 
      
1.321*** 
 
(0.013) (0.190)  (0.022) (0.239)  
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 x 
after Feb 
2012 
   
0.042 
  
-0.023 
  (0.029)   (0.028) 
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 
   
-0.026 
       -
0.125*** 
  (0.019)   (0.021) 
Kleibergen-
Paap rk 
Wald F 
statistic 
  
50.74 
  
 
 
50.74 
 
 
Observations 572,380 572,380 572,380 572,380 572,380 572,380 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, 
*significant at 10%. In all specifications the sample is restricted to firms in the private sector. All 
specifications include controls for time (year/month dummies), the share of share of full-time and the 
share of female employees at the firm, industry (1 digit), and region, and interactions of all controls with 
an indicator of whether the observation is drawn after 2012, but coefficients estimates are not reported. 
Instrumental variables estimation employs as instruments for the share of employees under 25 years in 
each period and its interaction with whether the observation is drawn after 2012, the share of employees 
at the firm turning 25 years in each period and its interaction with whether the observation is drawn after 
2012.  
 
Overall, our results of the impact of the change in minimum wage legislation in February 
2012 support a positive and significant relationship between minimum wages and 
individual and firm-level wages, but no systematic relationship between the level of the 
minimum wage and employment. The latter is consistent with some of the recent 
evidence from Greece of no systematic and robust effect of the differential reduction of 
minimum wage for employees below and above 25 in February 2012 on the employment 
opportunities of youth just below and above this threshold (Karakitsios, 2015; 
Kakoulidou et al., 2018).  
Closing, we should mention two possible limitations of our analysis, concerning possible 
employment adjustments that we cannot examine due to the nature of our data. First, 
                                                      
22 This is also supported by the results in the Appendix that there is no anticipation effect of crossing the 
25 years old threshold on individuals wages and the conditional probability of remaining employed in the 
private sector. 
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we were not able to investigate here the impact of minimum wages on hours in any of 
the periods we examine. Given that dismissals are costly23, this could be an important 
margin of adjustment to changes in the minimum wage. Second, we were also not able 
to investigate whether there were employment effects resulting from exit or entry of 
firms in the long-run emanating from changes in the minimum wage. Indeed, using a 
different data source, Yannelis (2014) finds lower relative employment as a result of this 
change among youth just older than 25 years, realised entirely through a lower relative 
share among new hires in the first two years after the reform. We consider these two 
channels as possible avenues for future research. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The employment effect of minimum wages has been and remains a deeply controversial 
topic in the economics literature. The debate is mostly based on evidence from the USA 
and there is relatively less evidence from other contexts. Moreover, more recent studies 
seem to produce divergent results. A potential explanation of this, which has not been 
systematically investigated, is that the magnitude of the employment effects of 
minimum wages may vary with a range of factors. For example, a negative employment 
effect of minimum wages may be more likely to be detected in a context where the 
initial level of the minimum wage is relatively high, the magnitude of the change in the 
minimum wage is large, the level of aggregate economic activity is low, and labour 
market regulation is weak.  
This paper addresses this gap in the literature by looking at the impact of minimum wage 
on wages and employment in Greece during the period between 2009 and 2017. During 
this period, Greece experienced an unprecedented recession and a dramatic 
deregulation of labour market institutions, as well as various changes in the minimum 
wage, including two increases, one reduction, and an introduction of a youth minimum 
wage enacted at different points of the recession and through different mechanisms.  
Using a unique administrative panel matched employer-employee dataset and 
employing a range of estimators, such as difference-in-differences, fixed effects, and 
Instrumental Variables, we find that minimum wages have a positive and significant 
effect on individual and firm-level wages with significant positive wage spill-overs 
extending, sometimes, above the median wage, but no systematic employment effects.  
This is consistent with a number of empirical studies and reconciles with predictions of 
models of imperfect competition in the labour market.  
 
 
                                                      
23 Dismissals, however, became must less costly, after the introduction of Greece in the structural 
adjustment program, as a result of a number of reforms related to employment protection.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Occupation, Industry, and Region Composition of Employees in the EFKA Data, 
2009-2017 
Occupation Industry Region 
Managers 0.68 Agriculture, 
hunting, forestry, 
and fishing 
0.40 Attiki 60.60 
Professionals 0.35 Mining, energy, 
and water 
1.67 North Aegean 0.86 
Technicians 
and associate 
professionals 
 
8.05 Manufacturing 17.29 South Aegean 3.03 
Clerical support 
workers 
 
28.23 Construction 3.04 Crete 4.71 
Services and 
sales workers 
20.16 Whole and retail 
trade, hotels, and 
restaurants 
37.60 East Macedonia 
and Thrace 
2.78 
Skilled 
agricultural, 
forestry, and 
fishing 
0.36 Transport, 
storage, and 
communication 
7.79 Central 
Macedonia  
13.14 
Craft and 
related trades 
7.22 Banking, Finance, 
and Insurance 
15.06 West 
Macedonia 
1.19 
Plant and 
machine 
operators 
8.99 Public 
administration, 
education, and 
health 
7.53 Epirus 1.55 
Elementary 
occupations 
14.88 Other services 5.46 Thessaly 3.20 
Armed forces 0 No information 4.17 Ionian Islands 1.38 
No information 5.19   Western Greece 2.67 
    Central Greece 2.31 
    Peloponnese 2.57 
    No information 0 
Number of 
observations 
1,043,127 
Number of 
observations 
1,043,127 
Number of 
observations 
1,043,127 
Notes: Figures are percentages. The sample is restricted to employees in the private sector.  
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Table A.2: Industry, and Region Composition of Firms in the EFKA Data, 2009-2017 
Industry Region 
Agriculture, 
hunting, forestry, 
and fishing 
0.47 Attiki 49.36 
Mining, energy, 
and water 
0.67 North Aegean 1.25 
Manufacturing 15.55 South Aegean 4.32 
Construction 3.51 Crete 6.06 
Whole and retail 
trade, hotels, and 
restaurants 
43.18 East Macedonia and 
Thrace 
3.62 
Transport, storage, 
and 
communication 
6.17 Central Macedonia  15.21 
Banking, Finance, 
and Insurance 
10.25 West Macedonia 1.55 
Public 
administration, 
education, and 
health 
8.60 Epirus 1.95 
Other services 6.89 Thessaly 4.42 
No information 4.7 Ionian Islands 2.17 
  Western Greece 3.73 
  Central Greece 3.00 
  Peloponnese 3.27 
  No information 0 
Number of 
observations 
698,001 
Number of 
observations 
698,001 
Notes: Figures are percentages. The sample is restricted to firms in the private sector. 
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Table A.3: Fixed Effects (FE) Estimates of the Effect of the Minimum Wage on Individual Log 
Monthly Wage, 2009-2017 
 All  Wages at or 
below the Adult 
Minimum Wage 
after Feb 2012 
Wages above the 
Adult Minimum 
Wage after Feb 
2012 and below 
the Median Wage 
in Dec 2011 
Wages above the 
Median Wage in Dec 
2011 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
     0.039*** 0.059 0.001 0.002 
(0.014) (0.056) (0.007) (0.012) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag 1  
-0.022 -0.074 0.003 -0.012 
(0.013) (0.048) (0.007) (0.010) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 1 
0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.020 
(0.013) (0.039) (0.007) (0.012) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag 2 
0.006 0.018 -0.005 -0.008 
(0.012) (0.030) (0.006) (0.010) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 2 
-0.005 -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.015) (0.035) (0.007) (0.025) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag3  
0.009 0.008 0.006 0.021 
(0.013) (0.037) (0.006) (0.013) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 3 
-0.019 -0.023 -0.005 0.005 
(0.017) (0.035) (0.008) (0.025) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag 4 
  0.023* 0.032     0.014**      0.034*** 
(0.012) (0.035) (0.007) (0.013) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 4 
0.019 0.029 -0.004 0.026 
(0.016) (0.032) (0.009) (0.020) 
Observations 434,414 58,730 145,531 230,153 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant 
at 5%, *significant at 10%. In all specifications the sample is restricted to employees in the private sector. 
All specifications include a set of controls, but their coefficients are not reported. These include a 
contemporaneous measure and up to four lags and leads of the indicator for whether the individual is 
older than 25 years, as well as year/month dummies, a quadratic in age, controls for employer’s industry 
(1 digit) and region, and employee’s occupation (1 digit), and interactions of all these with whether the 
observation was drawn after 2012. 
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Table A.4: Fixed Effects (FE) Estimates of the Effect of the Minimum Wage on the Individual 
Conditional Probability of Remaining in the Private Sector, 2009-2017 
 All  Wages at or 
below the Adult 
Minimum Wage 
after Feb 2012 
Wages above the 
Adult Minimum 
Wage after Feb 
2012 and below the 
Median Wage in Dec 
2011 
Wages above the 
Median Wage in 
Dec 2011 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
-0.023 0.006 -0.032* -0.011 
(0.016) (0.041) (0.019) (0.040) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag 1  
0.018 -0.023 0.031* 0.000 
(0.015) (0.038) (0.018) (0.040) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 1 
0.004 -0.006 0.006 0.004 
(0.016) (0.039) (0.021) (0.041) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag 2 
-0.011 0.001 -0.005 -0.020 
(0.015) (0.036) (0.018) (0.035) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 2 
-0.006 -0.038 0.005 0.069 
(0.017) (0.040) (0.021) (0.049) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag3  
-0.011 0.027 -0.012 0.014 
(0.014) (0.037) (0.017) (0.028) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 3 
0.016 0.023 0.004 -0.055 
(0.017) (0.040) (0.022) (0.053) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag 4 
-0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.034* 
(0.010) (0.027) (0.013) (0.018) 
Older than 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 4 
-0.013 0.013 -0.013 -0.016 
(0.014) (0.031) (0.017) (0.044) 
Observations 712,976 173,214 248,044 291,718 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant 
at 5%, *significant at 10%. In all specifications the sample is restricted to employees in the private sector. 
All specifications include a set of controls, but their coefficients are not reported. These include a 
contemporaneous measure and up to four lags and leads of the indicator for whether the individual is 
older than 25 years, year/month dummies, and a quadratic in age, as well as controls for employer’s 
industry (1 digit) and region, and employee’s occupation (1 digit) measured in the previous period (3 
months), and interactions of all these with whether the observation was drawn after 2012.  
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Table A.5: Fixed Effects (FE) Estimates of the Effect of Minimum Wage on Firm-Level 
Outcomes, 2009-2017 
 Average Log Monthly Wage Log Number of Employees 
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
 
0.033 
 
0.021 
(0.041) (0.052) 
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag 1 
 
0.026 
 
0.083 
(0.040) (0.052) 
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 1 
 
0.036 
 
0.033 
(0.041) (0.059) 
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag 2 
 
0.028 
   
      0.136*** 
(0.039) (0.050) 
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 2 
 
0.023 
 
0.045 
(0.043) (0.065) 
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag 3 
 
0.044 
 
0.083* 
(0.033) (0.047) 
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 3 
 
0.007 
 
0.034 
(0.042) (0.057) 
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lag 4 
 
0.022 
 
  0.066* 
(0.034) (0.040) 
Share of 
employees 
turning 25 x 
after Feb 2012 
lead 4 
 
0.010 
 
 0.111* 
(0.053) (0.062) 
Observations 215,005 215,005 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, 
*significant at 10%. In all specifications the sample is restricted to firms in the private sector. All 
specifications include a set of controls, but their coefficients are not reported. These include a 
contemporaneous measure and up to four lags and leads of the share of employees turning 25, 
year/month dummies, the share of share of full-time and the share of female employees at the firm, 
controls for industry (1 digit), and region, and interactions of all controls with an indicator of whether the 
observation is drawn after 2012.  
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